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Foreword
Labor productivity is fundamental to economic growth, as modeled
formally in the literature on endogenous growth. Indeed, with global
capital markets and rapid transmission of technology, it can be argued
that human capital is more important than ever as a determinant of
national economic performance and individual well-being.
Fifty years ago higher education was largely a consumption good
for a middle-class elite. In most countries, 5 per cent (or less) of 18-
year olds went to university. With technological advance, the demand
for highly skilled workers has increased sharply: student and employer
demand for tertiary education and training is larger and more diverse
than previously, and is repeated, in the sense that people require re-
training. As a result, countries today increasingly have mass systems
of higher education. A central question, therefore, is how to ﬁnance
these systems so as to facilitate economic growth and equitable access
to higher education. In poorer countries, ﬁscal capacity is limited; and
even in richer countries, public spending is constrained by international
competition, which imposes limits to taxation in any one country, and
by parallel pressures such as population ageing. Public funding thus
needs to be supplemented by private sources.
In principle, private ﬁnance could come from family resources, from
a student’s earnings while a student, from a student’s future earnings,
from employers, from entrepreneurial activities by universities, and/or
from gifts and donations. But many of these sources are less lucrative
than they appear at ﬁrst sight. Family resources can be substantial, but
do nothing to improve access for students from poor backgrounds.
Earnings during student days are generally small (the USA is excep-
tional). Employer contributions are also generally small (each employer
has an interest in poaching people whose training has been ﬁnanced by
a competitor). Entrepreneurial activities by universities are also likely
to be small in many countries (again, the USA is an exception). Gifts,
for example through fundraising, are also largely illusory – even in the
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USA, large-scale fundraising is successful only for a small number of
the best-known universities and is largely irrelevant to other tertiary
institutions.
The only remaining option, and the only approach capable of yield-
ing resources on a large scale and in an equitable way, is to facilitate
consumption smoothing – i.e. to developmechanismswhich allow peo-
ple to gain access during their student days to their own future earnings.
Student loans are one way of doing so. However, there are good
reasons why the private market has developed loans to buy a house
but not loans to ﬁnance an educational qualiﬁcation. The theoretical
issue is how to design student loans taking account of constraints par-
ties face in writing and enforcing contracts. The resulting problems
include capital market imperfections (the absence of security for loans
for human capital) and information problems (for instance, adverse
selection) in ﬁnancial markets. Resolving those issues has taken time.
My own writing has focused on student loans with income-
contingent repayments, i.e. repayments in the form of x percent of a
person’s subsequent earnings until she has paid off the loan; and such
arrangements are now in place in several countries including Australia
(since 1989), New Zealand (1993), and the UK (1998). In my pro-
posals, students pay an interest rate broadly equal to the risk-free
borrowing rate, with repayments collected alongside income tax or
social security contributions. In most systems (e.g. in Australia and
New Zealand) the loans are publicly funded; but it is possible to bring
in private ﬁnance either (as in the UK) through the retrospective sale of
student debt, or (as in the USA) where students borrow from private
sources. In such a system, the loan contract is determined centrally
by government and is identical for all borrowers: loans are publicly
organised, but may be privately funded, the underlying model having
much of the ﬂavor of social insurance.
This book takes as its starting point the original proposal by Milton
Friedman to use equity rather than loan ﬁnance as the major device for
consumption smoothing. In Friedman’s original proposal, a student
ﬁnances her university education by selling the right to x percent of
her annual earnings. A low-earning student repays less than the cost
of her higher education, thus the stakeholder makes a loss; in the case
of a high-earnings student, the stakeholder makes a proﬁt.
The book’s important new insight is to bring the loan approach
and the equity ﬁnance approach together into a single analytical
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framework. As one example, consider what the author calls a human
capital contract (HCC), whereby a person obtains the ﬁnance for her
higher education by selling the right to x percent of her earning for
n years, i.e. equity ﬁnance of the sort just described. That contract
could be supplemented by a second contract in which the student buys
a human capital option (HCO), which insures the graduate against
overpaying if she turns out to be high earner. The combination of the
HCC and HCO is an income-contingent loan (ICL).
The application of option theory to the ﬁnance of higher education
is entirely new – ﬁnance theory meets ICLs. This is a signiﬁcant intel-
lectual advance.
As well as being an intellectual advance, the approach also points
toward policy innovation. If, as the book argues, equity ﬁnance is more
suitable to private contracts than loan ﬁnance, the combination of
an HCC with an HCO enables the private market to provide ICLs
based on individualized contracts. This, the book argues, improves
efﬁciency because of the resultingmarket signals. For example, it would
be possible to get a loan on better terms for a more expensive degree
with better earnings outcomes than for a cheaper degree with poorer
outcomes.
Aswith any radical idea, there are unresolved issues. The bookmakes
a powerful case for private ﬁnance of higher education and for a mech-
anism that gives market signals. That analysis (and the case for market
forces more generally) rests on the assumption that agents are well in-
formed. Though that is, for the most part, the right assumption for
higher education, issues remain about how to protect applicants who
are not well informed (there are obvious analogies with private pen-
sions – another example of consumption smoothing – where complex,
long-term contracts make consumer protection essential). Another is-
sue is whether HCCs are a form of slavery. The author argues that they
are not, because what the person pre-commits is a fraction of her future
income not her future activities, and thus retains full freedom over her
future course of action. I accept that argument fully but again, only if
it is right to assume that students are well informed.
In addition to analytical questions, the idea also raises practical
issues. That, however, detracts neither from the idea nor from the anal-
ysis. Income contingency was for many years regarded as sound in the-
ory but not capable of implementation. HCCs are an important and
powerful idea; and the idea is being tested on a small scale in a number
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of countries. Such testing is important and should be applauded: it
sheds light on the ﬁnancial stability of such arrangements and improves
our knowledge of ways of ensuring consumer protection. I look for-
ward with considerable interest to the outcomes of these pioneering
ventures.
Nicholas Barr
Professor of Public Economics, European
Institute, London School of Economics
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